Civil enforcement against senior bankers

Civil enforcement against senior bankers for the personal failure of the institutions that utilize them has been quiet in britain before the global financial meltdown in 2007. On the other hand, this unpleasant event that happened in the period between 2007 and 2009 straight shown the weaknesses of senior operations in the personal sector. Risk-taking supervision decisions, industry misconduct and mis-selling methods are the common malpractices in the financial sector. Gradually, this problem which is due to fragile governance and misbehaviour has become more and more serious. There is a quote from an article stating this kind of problem as "nothing consequently concentrates your brain as an urgent and complicated problem".[1]

However, generally, senior managers at finance institutions are typically incentivised with techniques that cause them to underestimate risk-acquiring from the perspective of the firms’ various other constituencies because they set the institution’s profit in the first place. This can result in a failure to recognize or fully appreciate in particular the correlation between low-probability risk and strong integrity.[2] Hence, it might not be best handled by enforcement against senior bankers.[3] As we know, a decision to be made equally to get the best interest of the lending company and the public is difficult. However, since weak governance were a problem for the fairness and transparency of the economical sector, it needs to be addressed as soon as possible.

Before determining if the law is taking satisfactory steps in addressing this senior administration problem, we should first check out look at previous conditions of the banks in the UK which failed in the global financial meltdown. First and foremost, Northern Rock, that was a home loan lender with a big market show, operated on a dangerous originate-to-distribute business model which relied on short-term money market funding to finance its intensive mortgage writing business. Even so, it went into problem when the amount of money markets dried up due to subprime mortgage defaults in the usa. Then the Financial Companies Authority (FSA) produced a report reflecting after what went wrong at Northern Rock.[4] Selected doubts were voiced about the chairman of the panel and the principle executive regarding their competence and decisions built. However, neither individual has been subject to any individual liability under the law. Thus, this reflects that the law was not having a consolidated composition to deal with individual liability in decision making.

Next, the Royal Lender of Scotland teetered on the brink of failing in early 2009. It turned out growing aggressively through large-scale acquisitions, such as for example of National Westminster Lender in the united kingdom in 2000.[5] IN-MAY 2007, Fred Goodwin, who was the principle Executive Officer of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group between 2001 and 2009, led the lender to acquire the Dutch bank ABN-AMRO, over-bidding for it in order to advantage its rival Barclays out of the race.[6] The deal was completed deal quickly without enough due diligence completed on ABN-AMRO’s assets. This action was severely questioned by the media in those days.[7] By early 2009, the lender faced significant losses due to the absorption of losses from ABN-AMRO’s intensive securitised possessions portfolio. This acquisition was proved wii move. However, although the Financial Solutions Authority criticised the senior supervision for poor risk decisions and governance tradition in its record on the Bank, no person has been subject to any individual liability beneath the law again.[8]

In addition, Halifax Lender of Scotland, actually, was a casualty of the global financial crisis for the reason that crisis crystallised the failure of an already unsafe business design.[9] The bank have been underwriting corporate loans with poor homework and standards in order to pursue rapid progress and growth. The Parliamentary Commission investigated the banking expectations and criticised the chairman, the chief executive and several board members. However, only 1 person, Peter Cummings, the director of the corporate finance division who led the business into writing enormous sums of undesirable corporate loans, was fined and disqualified by the Financial Solutions Authority.[10] No other individual has been subject to any individual liability. Hence, these previous cases show that the legal framework in this area had not been competent to do something as a deterrence and raise knowing of the senior bankers in making careful decisions in the best interest of the general public.

After the global financial meltdown, several carry out scandals were uncovered in the economic sector. Significant banks in the UK such as Barclays had been fined in significant amounts for rigging the London Inter-bank Offered Level.[11] The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), together with other international regulators, as well subjected a number of banks, incorporating Barclays and RBS, to track record fines over forex market-rigging.[12] The Salz Review[13], which revealed harmful sub-cultures in the large and sophisticated structures at Barclays, as well raised interesting questions. Query arises in regards to what extent senior management and the board ought to be responsible for the polluted banking tradition as organisational pyramid displays the decisions are often made at the top.[14]

The harms due to malpractices in the banking sector are not only individual losses, but also damaging market assurance and integrity. Good corporate governance issues. It persuades, prompts and encourages establishments to protect the honesty and integrity of main promises designed to investors and the general public.[15] In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, we can observe that many afflicted banks underwent senior operations changes. In fact, the general consensus of all key reports is that the overall economy would have had stronger chances of survival had there been extra professionalism among executives, better corporate governance structures and even more ethical behaviour within the banking sector.[16] However, new operations is unlikely to own significant effect on the existing posed problem if regulations is still lacking sufficient supervision in this region. In relation to this, Singapore, one of many world leading fiscal centres, recognises a regulatory framework that is sound, strong and good practices of leading jurisdictions is usually fundamental to reaching a thriving and liquid marketplace.[17]

We should now proceed to look at the development of the law in this area. Actually, the regulation of banking in the UK began with informal controls by the lender of England and was eventually positioned on a statutory basis by the Banking Act 1979. The next decades saw the passage of the Banking Act 1987 which increased the Bank of England’s regulatory and supervisory powers. As the united kingdom did not have any particular regime for dealing with banks in financial problems, a momentary Banking (Special Provisions) Work 2008 was approved to enable the resolution of challenges. That Act was then changed by the Banking Act 2009. From then on, Financial Services Act 2010 was exceeded which amended Financial Companies and Markets Act 2000 by strengthening the powers of the FSA and supplying it a ‘fiscal stability’ objective.[18]

In July 2012, following a group of banking scandals culminating in the LIBOR results, the united kingdom instituted a Parliamentary Commission comprising both Properties to inquire into how banking customs could be changed for good.[19] The Parliamentary Commission was of the perspective that individual standards are key to enhancing banking culture and hence enhanced regulation of people must be introduced to improve banking for good.[20] The Parliamentary Commission proposed increased regulatory liability for senior individuals and employees performing any function that "can harm the bank", in addition to a special criminal liability regime for senior people who have recklessly mismanaged a lender.[21]

In regards to the above, the Financial Companies (Banking Reform) Act 2013 has adopted a lot of the Parliamentary Commission recommendations. This Act provides been lauded by the Treasury as the ‘biggest reform to the united kingdom banking sector in a generation’, which can only help to increase conduct expectations among bankers.[22] This Act is seen at the heart of system-focussed reforms designed to increase general resilience of the united kingdom financial system to foreseeable future shocks and instability, as much as it can be seen in initiatives designed to strengthen the liability of individual actors operating within the overall financial system.[23] However, the Financial Offerings (Banking Reform) Act 2013 can be said to be a missed chance to boost the accountability of senior bankers for the fiscal failure of the establishments that employ them. Actually, individual liability is governed under Section 36 of the Act.[24]

We can examine this problem by viewing it from two perspectives. We have to first look at the express meaning and purpose which the Act wishes to carry out by its wordings. From the Take action, we can see that Section 36 provides a jurisdiction to prosecute misconduct in the financial services sector. Nevertheless, this jurisdiction is very broad. This can be observed in Section 36(1)(a)(i) and (ii). It claims that the senior supervisor either will need considered a decision or have agreed to the acquiring of a decision. Besides that, the senior manager has the duty to do something they might in order to stop such a decision getting considered. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Specifications (PCBS) in its June 2013 final report figured mismanagement and inability of control lie at the heart of standards and traditions in banking.[25] However, it appears that Section 36 is only intended to manage the process of making reckless decision while managing the lending company.

Furthermore,

the Act includes a number of limitations. First of all, ‘S’ stated in the Act must be a senior supervisor or an authorised person who is carrying out a ‘senior management function’, which is mentioned in S.19(2) of the Action.[26] In fact, many organisations contain delegated authority now therefore, this will narrow down the ambit of the offence. There is definitely one problem in accessing this jurisdiction identified by the Commission is that managers of varying levels can communicate preferences that provide go up to a risk without directing subordinate personnel explicitly. For example, this is shown in the London Interbank Offered Charge rigging scandal.[27] With regards to this, the law supplies the provision where in fact the senior bankers have the work to take measures as a way to prevent reckless decisions. Nevertheless, this 2013 Act nonetheless features its limitation to prosecute senior managers who are experienced and have become adept at encouraging reckless misconduct.

Besides that, the Action states that S should be alert to a risk that the decision in question may cause the failure of the lending company. This can be unfair to criminalise the actions of a decision-maker who didn’t appreciate or basically foresee a risk. The decision must actually bring the lending company to the risk of failure, not only risk causing losses to the bank. In addition, there is no single definition of carry out risk available. There are different definitions in use, depending on the emphasis, the causes and the effect.[28] This will make the Act seem to be vague in this impression.

The scope of the offence is bound further by the causation clause in Section 36 (1) (d) which declares that the execution of your choice causes the failing of the group institution. Failing in this context means is usually interpreted in 3 ways. First, the organization becomes insolvent. Second, any of the stabilisation options in Part 1 of the Banking Action 2009 is pleased by the lending company in question. Third, the lending company is taken for the purposes of the Financial Products and services Compensation Scheme to come to be unable or likely unable to satisfy promises made against it. Practically speaking, it is very difficult to prove or even to bring actions beneath the law.

In the article titled ‘Criminalising Lender Managers’, Professors Julia Dark and David Kershaw from the London University of Economics identified the difficulties faced by the drafters of the new legislation.[29] Actually, the law must be broad enough to provide a good deterrent to individual liability and also to satisfy general public demand for accountability. However, it cannot be legislated too extensively which would possibly let senior bankers to benefit from the loopholes of the law. In fact, it could be said that the criminal sanction provided by the Act delivers a crucial message and functions as an alarming see for the banking sector.

Apart from that, dilemma arises here concerning whether the law achieves its purpose practically. The actual purpose of regulations in this spot is said to be difficult to be achieved practically. The practical issue of the Work is that Section 36 is seemed to be a legal framework on how regulations and sanction will work because the probability of successful prosecution is fairly remote. Indeed, the Commission mentioned in its final record that it could not be easy to protected convictions for the offence. Nevertheless, the Commission felt that the provision should be created to "give pause for considered to the senior officers of UK banks". There happen to be two main reasons impacting the practicality of the law in this area.

First, there is the matter of causation. As a way to establish liability, the senior manager must trigger or his decision results in the institutional inability. Basically, it must be proved beyond reasonable uncertainty that the senior banker causes the failure of the financial institution. As we know, most of the business failures tend to be caused by a blend of factors. In any prosecution, as explained above, establishing that the decision of a senior supervisor cause the failing of a lender will be difficult. Finance institutions such as banks are often large organisations, and failing of the bank is not usually caused by only a person, but a combination of different facets. Hence, it is quite difficult to prove that the bank failure was due to a particular decision by an individual, if not difficult.[30] In fact, the federal government argued that ‘causing’ the bank’s failure should be interpreted as having substantially contributed to the inability during the Parliamentary debates on the costs. However, this interpretation is definitely unsupported by a plain reading of the Act. Hence, establishing causation actually and in law successfully might be very difficult practically.

Secondly, it also is apparently hard that the senior supervisor is aware of the chance that the implementation of a decision may cause bank failure since it is packed with uncertainties in the fiscal sector. Besides that, the Act states that his / her carry out fell "far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in their position". In fact, the doctrine of "reasonableness" can have several outcomes owing to different circumstances. For instance, if there is an imminent bank failure, a senior manager is fairly expected to take responsive but difficult decisions under pressure. This may cause proving the required mental aspect of the offence turn into very complicated. Besides that, misconduct or risk-taking decisions at one bank spreads over the sector, as the behaviour involves be seen as the "market norm" and no bank wants to skip the extra earnings from the practices. Therefore, it is difficult to apply the "reasonableness" check on senior bankers since a lay person might not know the actual cause of certain decisions made in that position. The idea of how these situations will be decided can only become clear when it comes to the court.

Apart from that, in deciding a potential prosecution under this Work, investigations on the problems are likely to require a high degree of usage of the lending company records. This may look like a heavy burden for the lending company in question. In the absence of sufficient evidence or info on what basically causes the bank’s failing, this is a waste of period for the authorities and the financial institution. Furthermore, if the investigating authority wants to research on every person mixed up in senior management decision, this action requires a certain period of time which can take months and even years. It might be even worse for a financial institution which does not have proper records of its key decisions. Besides that, it should be noted that not every decision is made at the overall meeting. Therefore, a study could use up management period.[31]

By looking at the nature of the Act, the new provision criminalises individuals’ actions by holding them in charge of having brought on the bank’s failure. However, the procedure of decision-making in large financial institutions is usually a collaborative process with some inputs from numerous senior managers or people sitting at the top level of the institutional pyramid. As explained above, an investigation upon this issue would possibly consume couple of months or years and this may disrupt the continuing administration.

In relation to the above, it shows that the laws must be clear and simple for folks to follow. Laws that will be overly vague or sophisticated and technical usually do not encourage compliance as they are too tricky to interpret and comply with.[32] Practically, this brand-new offence has its restrictions in finding senior bankers liable for making dangerous decisions because risk-taking may be the "spirit" of the financial sector. For example, in many capitalist societies, risk-taking is seen as a necessary part of business and it is hard to verify wrongdoing.[33] So, this illustrates that Section 36 may seem to be a "paper tiger" which is enacted even more for symbolic than actual punitive effect.[34]

Apart from that, regulations has another method of addressing senior bankers’ liability besides only applying the 2013 Work. The Financial Carry out Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) have got published the final approach to improve individual accountability in the banking sector. The Senior Managers Regime will make sure that senior managers can be held in charge of any misconduct that falls within their areas of responsibilities, while the new Certification Regime and Conduct Guidelines aim to hold persons working at all levels in banking to appropriate standards of conduct.[35] This has come into drive on 7 March 2016. In fact, the brand new UK Senior Managers Regime (SMR) has the potential to rebalance these incentives. It’s the product of a two 12 months procedure led by a parliamentary commission tasked with addressing widespread misconduct at banking institutions. The commission identified having less personal consequences for folks as a root cause of repeated terrible behaviour by organizations.[36] Under the SMR, an individual can be guilty of misconduct if the regulators will be able to show that there was a failure by a "relevant authorized person" within an area for which that each senior manager was in charge.[37]

Clearly, all centrepiece reforms of the Financial Offerings (Banking Reform) Act 2013 could be related to culture since it is currently understood by regulators: as "a couple of attitudes, ideals, goals and methods which together determine how a company behaves …"[38]; and in addition

by academic scholars: as the subsistence and transmitting of behaviours and beliefs which characterise particular cultural or economic groupings within and beyond these groupings.[39] From the in this article, we can see that the Financial Solutions (Banking Reform) Act 2013 could be seemed to act as a "reminder" or "notification" for the senior bankers never to make "extremely dangerous" decisions. And by having this legislation, senior bankers and the ones who are accountable for making decisions will be more cautious in foreseeable future decision making. However, almost speaking, it is challenging to come to be accessed as the fiscal or banking sector are full of uncertainties. No one can foresee the potential risk hidden in every decision made and no one should be blamed if your choice is made in the very best interest of the institution.

In short, a robust mechanism to promote desired behaviour is normally to ensure that senior managers of the banking institutions and their counterparties know about the likelihood of the systemic implications of their actions such as aware of the opportunity of their failure, and then the need to be worried about that risk.[40] Banks’ basic safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner where they conduct their business is central to economic health. Governance weaknesses at banking institutions, especially however, not exclusively, those that play a substantial role in the financial system, can lead to the transmission of concerns over the banking sector and into economies in outlying jurisdictions. Thus, effective and practical corporate governance is critical to the proper working of the banking sector and the global economy.[41]

In conclusion, the existence of the new offence may be appeared as a political device to comfort the public after the global financial crisis which has no real and practical impact on individual liability. On the other hand, this Act will anyhow become an over-all framework for senior bankers within their financial institutions to re-examine their decision making procedures and to ensure that they comply with the highest standards of transparency. An individual may argue that rigid rules or legislation might end attracting talents into the financial sector. However, if they’re not prepared to be bound by the legislation, they are obviously not the persons who can bring huge impact to the financial sector and therefore the national economy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Ellinger E. P., Lomnicka E and Hare C. V. M, Ellinger’s Present day Banking Law (5th edn, OUP, Oxford 2011)

Articles

A Minto, ‘Misconduct in banks: approaching the issue from a systemic point of view’ (2016).

A Salz, ‘The Salz Review: An Independent Overview of Barclays’ Business Practices’ (2013).

D Arsalidou and M Kambria-Kapardis, ‘Weak corporate governance can result in a country’s economic catastrophe: the circumstance of Cyprus’ (2015).

F. Hilmer, ‘Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to improve Company Performance’ (1993).

FCA, ‘FCA publishes final rules to make those in the banking sector considerably more accountable’ (2015).

Financial Stability Panel, ‘Peer Review Report on Risk Governance’ (2013).

FSA, ‘Final Find against Peter Cummings’ (2012).

FSA, ‘The Inability of the Royal Lender of Scotland: Financial Offerings Authority Board Report’ (2011).

FSA Board, ‘The Failing of the Royal Lender of Scotland’ (2011), para.581.

FSA Internal Audit Division, ‘The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learned Review’ (2008).

G Wilson and S Wilson, ‘Banking and regulation post-crisis: the importance of "culture" in the united kingdom and encounters from Australia’ (2016).

Hall and du Gay (eds), ‘Questions of Cultural Identification’ (1996); and Williams, ‘Traditions and Society: 1780-1950’ (2013).

House of Lords and Home www.testmyprep.com of Commons, ‘Changing Banking for Good’ (12 June2013), Vol.I, para.116

House of Lords and Home of Commons, ‘Changing Banking for Great’ (12 June 2013), Vol.II, paras 632-634

House of Lords and Residence of Commons Parliamentary Commission on Banking Specifications, ‘An Accident Waiting to Happen: The Failing of HBOS’ (2013).

Iris H.-Y. Chiu, ‘Regulatory responsibilities for directors in the monetary products and services sector and directors’ responsibilities in company regulation: bifurcation and interfaces’ (2016).

J Dark and D Kershaw, ‘Criminalising Bank Managers’ (2013).

J. Gapper, ‘Trading Flooring Culture no more Acceptable’ (2012).

J Stainsby and K Anderson, ‘Making individuals accountable: new regulatory frameworks for banking and for insurers’ (2015).

L.A good. Bebchuk, A Cohen and H Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008’ (2010).

M S. Kenney, A D. Moglia and A Stein, ‘Fraudsters at the gate: how corporate leaders confront and defeat institutional fraud: Part 1’ (2016).

Parliamentary Commission on Banking Requirements, ‘Changing Banking for Great’ (2013).

Singapore Parliamentary Debates, ‘Securities and Futures Bill’ (5 October 2001) Vol.73, cols 2127-2128.

T Hallett, ‘Symbolic Electric power and Organizational Culture’ (2003).

V. K. Rajah SC, ‘Prosecution of fiscal crimes and its relationship to a culture of compliance’ (2016).

Official Published Sources

J. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Guarantees Broken (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2008).

Electronic Sources

BBC Information, ‘NatWest Takeover Battle’

<http://information.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/621211.stm> accessed 26 March 2017.

BBC Media, ‘RBS Secures Takeover of ABN Amro’

<http://media.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/organization/7033176.stm> accessed 26 March 2017.

The Independent, ‘Was ABN the worst takeover offer ever?’

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/was-abn-the-worst-takeover-deal-ever-1451520.html> accessed 26 March 2017

C Coltart, ‘Banking act is normally a paper tiger’, The Law Society Gazette

<https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/banking-act-is-a-paper-tiger/5039694.article> accessed 26 March 2017.

D Gilroy, ‘Banking Reform Act 2013, an excellent idea with poor implementation’

<https://www.stephensons.co.uk/site/blog/commercial-blog/banking_reform_act_2013_good_idea_poor_implementation> accessed 27 March 2017.

L Hodges, ‘Jail bankers for failure? The brand new criminal offence is an unworkable paper tiger’

<http://www.cityam.com/236030/jail-bankers-for-failure-the-new-criminal-offence-is-an-unworkable-paper-tiger> accessed 27 March 2017.

Norton Rose Fulbright, ‘Criminal liability for senior bankers’

<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/122774/criminal-liability-for-senior-bankers> accessed 27 March 2017.

R Burger and M Bonnell, ‘Individual Accountability in Banking and Finance’

<http://www.bloomsburylawonline.com/individual-accountability-in-banking-and-finance/> accessed 27 March 2017.

S McWilliam, ‘UK’s New Regime to carry Senior Bankers In charge of Helping the Corrupt IS ACTUALLY A Game-Changer’

<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/uks-new-regime-hold-senior-bankers-accountable-helping-corrupt-could-be-game-changer/> accessed 27 March 2017.

The Economist, ‘Why include so few bankers gone to jail?’

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-why-few-bankers-gone-to-jail> accessed 27 March 2017.

The Guardian, ‘Libor-rigging scandal: three former Barclays traders found guilty’

<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/04/libor-rigging-scandal-three-former-barclays-traders-found-guilty> accessed 26 March 2017.

World News, ‘UK regulator fines five banking institutions $1.7 billion after currency rigging probe’

<https://document.wn.com/look at/2014/11/12/UK_regulator_fines_five_banks_17_billion_after_currency_rigg_n/> accessed 26 March 2017.

Table of Statutes

Financial Providers (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s. 19(2)

Financial Products and services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s. 36

[1] F. Hilmer, ‘Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to improve Company Performance’ (1993).

[2] L.A. Bebchuk, A Cohen and H Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Reimbursement at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008’ (2010).

[3] Iris H.-Y. Chiu, ‘Regulatory obligations for directors in the personal products and services sector and directors’ obligations in company legislation: bifurcation and interfaces’ (2016).

[4] FSA Internal Audit Division, ‘The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learned Review’ (2008).

[5] BBC News, ‘NatWest Takeover Battle’

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/organization/621211.stm> accessed 26 March 2017.

[6] BBC Information, ‘RBS Secures Takeover of ABN Amro’

<http://reports.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7033176.stm> accessed 26 March 2017.

[7] The Independent, ‘Was ABN the worst takeover deal ever?’

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/was-abn-the-worst-takeover-deal-ever-1451520.html> accessed 26 March 2017

[8] FSA, ‘The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial Products and services Authority Board Report’ (2011).

[9] House of Lords and Property of Commons Parliamentary Commission on Banking Benchmarks, ‘An Accident Waiting to occur: The Failing of HBOS’ (2013).

[10] FSA, ‘Final See against Peter Cummings’ (2012).

[11] J. Gapper, ‘Trading Floor Lifestyle no more Acceptable’ (2012).

[12] World News, ‘UK regulator fines five banking institutions $1.7 billion after currency rigging probe’

https://article.wn.com/check out/2014/11/12/UK_regulator_fines_five_banks_17_billion_after_currency_rigg_n/

accessed 26 March 2017.

[13] A Salz, ‘The Salz Analysis: An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices’ (2013).

[14] T Hallett, ‘Symbolic Ability and Organizational Culture’ (2003).

[15] J. Macey, Corporate Governance: Claims Kept, Claims Broken (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2008).

[16] D Arsalidou and M Kambria-Kapardis, ‘Weak corporate governance can lead to a country’s economical catastrophe: the circumstance of Cyprus’ (2015).

[17] Singapore Parliamentary Debates, ‘Securities and Futures Expenses’ (5 October 2001) Vol.73, cols 2127-2128.

[18] E. P. Ellinger, E Lomnicka and C. V. M Hare, Ellinger’s Contemporary Banking Law (5th edn, OUP, Oxford 2011) 27.

[19] J Stainsby and K Anderson, ‘Making individuals accountable: different regulatory frameworks for banking and for insurers’ (2015).

[20] Residence of Lords and House of Commons, ‘Changing Banking for Great’ (12 June2013), Vol.I, para.116

[21] Home of Lords and Home of Commons, ‘Changing Banking for Great’ (12 June 2013), Vol.II, paras 632-634

[22] C Coltart, ‘Banking act is normally a paper tiger’, The Law Society Gazette

<https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/banking-act-is-a-paper-tiger/5039694.article> accessed 26 March 2017.

[23] G Wilson and S Wilson, ‘Banking and regulation post-crisis: the importance of "culture" in the united kingdom and experience from Australia’ (2016).

[24] Financial Services (Banking Reform) Work 2013, s.36

[25] Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, ‘Changing Banking for Great’ (2013).

[26] Financial Services (Banking Reform) Work 2013, s.19(2)

[27] The Guardian, ‘Libor-rigging scandal: three former Barclays dealers found guilty’

<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/04/libor-rigging-scandal-three-former-barclays-traders-found-guilty> accessed 26 March 2017.

[28] Financial Stability Board, ‘Peer Assessment Record on Risk Governance’ (2013).

[29] J Black and D Kershaw, ‘Criminalising Bank Managers’ (2013).

[30] D Gilroy, ‘Banking Reform Act 2013, an excellent idea with poor implementation’

<https://www.stephensons.co.uk/site/blog/commercial-blog/banking_reform_act_2013_good_idea_poor_implementation> accessed 27 March 2017.

[31] Norton Rose Fulbright, ‘Criminal liability for senior bankers’

<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/122774/criminal-liability-for-senior-bankers> accessed 27 March 2017.

[32] V. K. Rajah SC, ‘Prosecution of financial crimes and its relationship to a lifestyle of compliance’ (2016).

[33] The Economist, ‘Why have thus few bankers attended jail?’

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-why-few-bankers-gone-to-jail> accessed 27 March 2017.

[34] L Hodges, ‘Jail bankers for inability? The brand new criminal offence can be an unworkable paper tiger’

<http://www.cityam.com/236030/jail-bankers-for-failure-the-new-criminal-offence-is-an-unworkable-paper-tiger> accessed 27 March 2017.

[35] FCA, ‘FCA publishes final rules to make those in the banking sector more accountable’ (2015).

[36] S McWilliam, ‘UK’s New Regime to carry Senior Bankers Accountable for Helping the Corrupt Could Be A Game-Changer’

<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/uks-new-regime-hold-senior-bankers-accountable-helping-corrupt-could-be-game-changer/> accessed 27 March advice on how to write an exploratory essay 2017.

[37] R Burger and M Bonnell, ‘Individual Accountability in Banking and Finance’

<http://www.bloomsburylawonline.com/individual-accountability-in-banking-and-finance/> accessed 27 March 2017.

[38] FSA Board, ‘The Failing of the Royal Bank of Scotland’ (2011), para.581.

[39] Hall and du Gay (eds), ‘Questions of Cultural Identification’ (1996); and Williams, ‘Traditions and Society: 1780-1950’ (2013).

[40] A Minto, ‘Misconduct in banks: approaching the problem from a systemic perspective’ (2016).

[41] M S. Kenney, A D. Moglia and A Stein, ‘Fraudsters at the gate: how corporate leaders confront and defeat institutional fraud: Part 1’ (2016).

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